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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
Freedom to Read Foundation is a non-profit organization that does not have any
parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held
corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
American Library Association is a non-profit organization that does not have any
parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held
corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
Asian/Pacific American Librarians Association is a non-profit organization that
does not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists
no publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
Black Caucus of the American Library Association is a non-profit organization that
does not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists
no publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression is a non-profit organization
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that does not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there
exists no publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
Comic Book Legal Defense Fund is a non-profit organization that does not have
any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly
held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
National Association For Ethnic Studies is a non-profit organization that does not
have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
National Coalition Against Censorship is a non-profit organization that does not
have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the
National Council of Teachers of English is a non-profit organization that does not
have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1),
REFORMA: the National Association to Promote Library and Information
ii
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Services to Latinos and the Spanish-Speaking is a non-profit organization that does
not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.

iii
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Freedom to Read Foundation is an organization established by the
American Library Association to promote and defend First Amendment rights,
foster libraries as institutions that fulfill the promise of the First Amendment,
support the right of libraries to include in their collections and make available to
the public any work they may legally acquire, and establish legal precedent for the
freedom to read of all citizens.1
The American Library Association (ALA) is the oldest and largest library
association in the world providing advocacy, information, and resources to
librarians and library users. It actively defends the right of library users to read,
seek information, and speak freely as guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The Asian/Pacific American Librarians Association is an ALA affiliate
supporting and promoting library services to the Asian American and Pacific
Islander communities and advances the leadership roles of members through
informed dialogue and forums.

1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), Amici state that no party’s counsel authored
this brief in whole or in part; that no party or party’s counsel contributed money
that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and that no person
other than Amici, their members, or their counsel contributed money that was
intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.
1
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The Black Caucus of the American Library Association advocates and
promotes improvement of library services to the nation’s African American
community.
The American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression (ABFFE)
informs and educates booksellers and the public about the dangers of censorship
and promotes the free expression of ideas, particularly freedom in the choice of
reading materials.
The Comic Book Legal Defense Fund (CBLDF) is dedicated to defending
the First Amendment rights of comic book readers, publishers, retailers, librarians
and educators.
The National Association For Ethnic Studies (NAES) is the preeminent
Ethnic Studies organization in the United States. It supports the First Amendment
rights to access, and freedom to read and speak about, the issues raised in ethnic
studies materials.
The National Coalition Against Censorship is an alliance of more than 50
national organizations promoting free expression. A signature program, the Youth
Free Expression Project, defends young people’s right of access to information and
their right to question, learn, and think for themselves.
The National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) is devoted to
improving education in English and the English language arts. It seeks to ensure
2
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students’ rights to read and to learn, and to promote professional growth for
teachers.
REFORMA: the National Association to Promote Library and Information
Services to Latinos and the Spanish-Speaking, promotes the development of library
collections to include Spanish-language and Latino-oriented materials and to
develop library services and professionals that meet Latino communities’ needs.
Amici are all deeply concerned about the effect of Arizona’s legislation on
the First Amendment rights of its student-citizens. By prohibiting certain
categories of classroom materials and by eliminating the Tucson Unified School
District’s Mexican-American Studies (MAS) program, the State of Arizona is
infringing on students’ First Amendment rights to access books and classroom
instruction.
In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), all parties have consented to the
filing of this brief.

3
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The First Amendment protects the rights of students to access and receive
information in the classroom. These rights ensure that America’s youths are
exposed to the diversity of ideas necessary to ensure an educated citizenry who can
effectively participate in our democracy. Arizona Revised Statute § 15-112
threatens these rights. For partisan and political reasons, the statute was aimed at
and launched to dismantle Tucson’s MAS program. Moreover, the statute is so
broad that Arizona teachers and school districts must skirt a wide swath of
protected instruction and material to avoid the possibility of serious penalties.
Thus, the statute will chill a substantial amount of instruction that is beyond the
purported purpose of the statute.
This banning of books and courses from the classroom – both by direct
application and by chilling effect – violates the First Amendment rights of
students.

4
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ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION 15-112 VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE
IT FURTHERS POLITICAL AND PARTISAN INTERESTS, NOT
LEGITIMATE PEDAGOGICAL PURPOSES.
A.

Students Have a First Amendment Right To Receive Information
in Schools.

Schools play a foundational role in shaping our society. “‘[T]he public
school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for
promoting our common destiny ....’” Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584
(1987) (quoting Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). As part of a public school’s obligation to shape and
promote democracy, it must expose students to a range of ideas. “The classroom is
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.” Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Based on these principles, courts,
including the district court below, have repeatedly recognized that students have a
First Amendment right to receive information. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High
Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998).
Students have the right “to receive a broad range of information so that they
can freely form their own thoughts: ‘[m]ore importantly, the right to receive ideas
5
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is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of
speech, press, and political freedom.’” Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion)) (alterations in original). The “scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,” and the student in
particular, is necessary because schools “are educating the young for citizenship.”
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); accord
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.”).
This right necessarily constrains State authority to censor curriculum,
education materials, and classroom instruction. To be sure, States and school
boards have significant discretion in matters related to the education of students.
See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). But this
discretion is not boundless; it “must be exercised in a manner that comports with
the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment.” Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583
(quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion)) (quotation mark omitted). For
example, States may not for religious reasons either require schools to teach
creationism or prohibit the instruction of evolution. Id. at 594; Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). Similarly, States may not dictate curriculum in

6
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a manner that violates students’ right to receive information. Monteiro, 158 F.3d
at 1027 n.5.
B.

A State May Not Withdraw Students’ Access to Curriculum
Materials for Narrowly Partisan or Political Reasons.

Under this framework, the First Amendment restrains a State from removing
curriculum materials for narrowly partisan or political reasons. In Pico, 457 U.S.
at 870 (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court plurality held that while a school
district “rightly possesses significant discretion to determine the content of their
school libraries[,] ... that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or
political manner” to restrict students’ access to information. The three dissenters
“cheerfully concede[d]” that principle. Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus,
a majority of the Court agreed that removing books for partisan or political reasons
will be unconstitutional where the removal occurs to deny students “access to ideas
with which [the school officials] disagreed.” 2 Id. at 871; accord Minarcini v.
Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976) (privilege of access
to books in library “is not subject to being withdrawn by succeeding school boards
whose members might desire to ‘winnow’ the library for books the content of
which occasioned their displeasure or disapproval”).
2

Justifications for removing the books in Pico included that they were “antiAmerican” and “offensive to Americans in general,” Pico, 457 U.S. at 873 –
sentiments remarkably similar to those raised in Arizona. See, e.g., ER 1055 (“It is
certainly strange to find a textbook in an American public school taking the
Mexican side of the battle at the Alamo.”).
7
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Although Pico arose in the context of school libraries, its reasoning cannot
be cabined solely to the removal of books from libraries. This Court has held that
Pico’s principles “are also relevant in the context of a school curriculum.”
Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1027 n.5. Thus, although States and school districts have
latitude to shape curriculum, they may not ban books from classroom instruction or
eliminate courses merely because politicians disagree with the ideas expressed in
some of the books.
Strong justifications support applying Pico beyond the context of school
libraries. The harm from injecting partisan and political ideology into classroom
curricula can be every bit as serious as the long-recognized harm caused by
removing books from the library. Id. at 1029 n.8 (discussing with approval Pratt v.
Independent School District No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 1982)). Students
who lose access to materials and courses suffer harm because they are denied the
enrichment that comes from reading a book or poem and then discussing that
material as part of a broader lesson. Thus, the First Amendment harms flowing
from censorship of the curriculum are real and identifiable.
Other circuits have also recognized that the First Amendment constrains
States and school boards from tampering with curricula by removing materials

8
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from instruction for political reasons. 3 Students have a right “to be free from
official conduct [regarding curriculum] that [is] intended to suppress the ideas
expressed” in the materials removed from classroom instruction. Pratt, 670 F.2d at
776; see also, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th
Cir. 1980) (“[A]cademic freedom at the secondary school level precludes a local
board from imposing ‘a pall of orthodoxy’ on the offerings of the classroom, which
might ... impair permanently the student’s ability to investigate matters that arise in
the natural course of intellectual inquiry.” (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602)).
Despite Monteiro’s embrace of Pico, the district court improperly held that
Pico “does not apply directly” to the case at bar. ER 11. It held that Hazelwood –
not Pico – provided the proper framework for analysis. ER 14. In Hazelwood, the
Court held that school officials could exercise “editorial control” over the content
of the journalism class’s school paper – which the Court characterized as “part of
the school curriculum” – “so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 484 U.S. at 271, 273.

3

Some cases since Pico have upheld States’ selection of curriculum materials; they
are distinguishable because none involved the banning of books, materials, and
courses from the curriculum for political reasons. See Griswold v. Driscoll, 616
F.3d 53, 55, 58-60 (1st Cir. 2010) (Pico did not apply to revisions to curriculum
guide that did not ban use of other materials); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 61517 (5th Cir. 2005) (State selection of preferred textbooks did not violate students’
First Amendment rights); Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia Cnty., 862 F.2d 1517,
1523 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989) (declining to decide standard when curriculum materials
are removed due to “opposition to the ideas contained in the disputed materials”).
9
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But Pico and Hazelwood are not mutually exclusive. Properly read, these
two cases articulate a consistent view of State discretion over schools, including
curriculum. Although States have significant curricular discretion, it must be
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
273. Pico illustrates one instance where such legitimate concern is lacking: where
materials are removed from a school library not for pedagogical reasons, but due to
partisan or political disapproval of, and an intent to suppress, the ideas expressed in
those materials. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-72. Similarly, if books (or entire
courses) are removed from school curricula for narrowly partisan or political
reasons, the State’s action violates the students’ First Amendment rights.
Nor can the state rely on the government speech doctrine to justify an
unfettered right to remove materials. The broad discretion to shape curriculum
does not include the power to indulge partisan or political motivations.
Accordingly, the district court properly held that the government speech doctrine
has no application in this case.
C.

The Tucson MAS Program Was Targeted by State Authorities
Based on Partisan and Political Motivations.

Applying Pico to § 15-112, it is clear that both the enactment of the statute
and the determination that MAS (but not other ethnic studies programs) violated
the statute were “narrowly partisan or political” decisions by officials who had

10

Case: 13-15657

11/25/2013

ID: 8876559

DktEntry: 17

Page: 20 of 42

long sought removal of the MAS program, and who had even campaigned on a
promise to remove it.
1. Section 15-112 Was Enacted Based on Animus Toward the MAS
Program and Mexican Immigrants.
There is strong evidence that the statute itself was motivated by political
animus toward the MAS program specifically and toward Mexicans and MexicanAmericans more generally. Started to address a federal desegregation order, the
MAS program had significantly closed the achievement gap for Latino students
who took MAS classes. ER 197-204, 1964-2016. However, in 2006, Tucson High
Magnet School hosted invited guest Delores Huerta, co-founder of the United
Farm Workers of America, to address the student body. During her remarks, she
commented that “Republicans hate Latinos.” ER 1054. In response, thenSuperintendent Tom Horne invited another speaker to “refute” Ms. Huerta’s
statements. Id. During that presentation, at which no questions were allowed, a
group of students silently walked out in protest. ER 1055.
Horne’s response was to write an “Open Letter to the Citizens of Tucson”
calling for the termination of the MAS program. ER 1053. Demonstrating that
politics – not academic content – was at issue, Horne praised the “polite[]”
behavior exhibited by “teenage Republicans,” but criticized the “rudeness” of
protesting students. ER 1055. In Horne’s view, this “rudeness” was due to the

11
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MAS program and teachers, who Horne was concerned were “left-leaning” and
“progressive[].” ER 1055, 1057.
Importantly, these criticisms arose in the context of a broader political
debate in Arizona about immigration – particularly from Mexico. While it was
considering outlawing courses “designed” for one ethnic group, the Arizona
legislature was also enacting other anti-immigration laws that were then challenged
in federal court. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012);
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), aff’g sub nom.
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009). Indeed,
the legislative history of § 15-112 reflects the view that MAS is part of Mexico’s
plan “to take over the southwest United States.”4 Other testimony opposed the
MAS program because “I absolutely deplore people who come from another
country and do not want anything to do with the culture, the language, or anything
that has to do with our government ....” 5 Finally, the two officials –
Superintendents Horne and Huppenthal – whose findings have required the
elimination of the MAS program both vigorously pursued the legislation while

4

Hearing of H. Comm. on Appropriations, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 37:0937:22 (Ariz. Apr. 16, 2008),
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=7&clip_id=3485&meta_id=6
0106.
5
Id. at 21:12-21:24.
12
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announcing their political opposition to the MAS program. Indeed, Huppenthal
campaigned for office on a pledge that he would “[S]top La Raza.” 6 ER 1288.
2. Superintendents Horne and Huppenthal Eliminated the MAS
Program for Political Reasons.
Once § 15-112 was enacted, Horne and his immediate successor,
Superintendent Huppenthal, wasted no time in targeting and dismantling the MAS
program. In fact, Horne issued his findings the day before the statute even became
effective, noting, in passing, that several other ethnic studies programs in Arizona
might also violate the statute, but confining his findings to the MAS program.
ER 28. As the district court explained,
Superintendent Horne issued his Finding of Violation on his last day
in office, December 30, 2010. His Finding went into effect January 1,
2011, the same day that § 15-112 went into effect. The timing of the
Finding underscores Horne’s determination to do away with the MAS
program, and it also means that Horne necessarily applied the statute
retroactively, without any effort to show that the problematic
materials were in use at the time of the Finding.
ER 27 (citation omitted). Indeed, Horne’s findings essentially parroted the same
political concerns expressed in his “Open Letter” almost three years earlier.
Compare ER 2183-92 with ER 1053-58.
Meanwhile, as chair of the Senate education committee, Senator Huppenthal
worked to pass the bill while pledging in his political campaign for Superintendent
to eliminate MAS. See ER 1256-57. After winning the Superintendent spot,
6

“La Raza” is used to refer to the MAS program. See ER 1287.
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(replacing Tom Horne), he initially commissioned an independent, third-party
audit of the entire MAS curriculum. See ER 1092. But when the auditors found
“no observable evidence was present to suggest that any classroom within Tucson
Unified School District is in direct violation of the law A.R.S. 15-112(A),” ER
2251, Huppenthal looked for another opinion. Preferring his own expertise, he
conducted his own personal review and identified specific classroom materials that
he concluded violated the statute. See ER 1092-94, 1098-1104.
These circumstances demonstrate that the statute and Huppenthal’s findings
were motivated by a narrow political and partisan interest in denying access to
materials with which the decisionmakers disagreed. As applied to the MAS
program, Arizona Revised Statute § 15-112 violates the First Amendment rights of
the plaintiffs because it removed the students’ access to the MAS curriculum
materials for narrowly partisan and political reasons. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 87071.7

7

Should the Court conclude that this significant record includes disputed facts, it
should, at the very least, consider remanding the case for further development of
these factual issues.
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SECTION 15-112 IS OVERBROAD BECAUSE IT WILL CHILL
SUBSTANTIAL MATERIALS STUDENTS HAVE A FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECEIVE.
Even if § 15-112 were passed for a legitimate pedagogical purpose, the

statute is nevertheless unconstitutional because it is overbroad and will chill
substantial instruction that would not violate its purpose.
A.

A Statute Restricting Materials or Curriculum Is
Unconstitutionally Overbroad if it Chills Substantial Instruction
Beyond the Purpose of the Law.

The district court properly recognized that § 15-112 is unconstitutional if it
chills substantial instruction that does not further the statute’s purpose. See ER 1516. “In a facial challenge to a law’s validity under the First Amendment, the law
may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936,
944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 449 U.S. 460, 473
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012).
“The overbreadth doctrine exists ‘out of concern that the threat of
enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or “chill” constitutionally protected
speech ....’” Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)). In the
specific context of education, this means that although a State may limit materials
and curricula where its “actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical

15
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concerns,” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273, that control goes too far where the threat
of enforcement results in schools excluding other materials that do not raise those
pedagogical concerns. And where the chilled instruction is “substantial,” the law
must be held to be unconstitutional. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473.
The asserted purpose of § 15-112 is to ensure that students are “taught to
treat and value each other as individuals” and not be “taught to resent or hate other
races or classes of people.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111. Amici certainly agree that
this is a legitimate pedagogical purpose, and that the State can reasonably decide
that Arizona schools should inculcate tolerance, respect, and understanding – not
hatred and resentment. But because students have a First Amendment right to
receive information and access materials in the classroom, see Monteiro, 158 F.3d
at 1027 n.5, § 15-112 must be held to be unconstitutional if the breadth of the
statute causes teachers or schools to discard or avoid substantial material that
would not run afoul of the state’s interest in teaching students “to treat and value
each other as individuals,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111.
B.

Severe Sanctions, Like Those Here, Establish Substantial
Overbreadth.

When evaluating overbreadth, the severity of the sanction is a significant
factor in evaluating whether the statute will chill substantial protected speech. The
possibility of a “substantial number of realistic applications in contravention of the
First Amendment” is sufficient to overturn a statute, and “the penalty to be
16
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imposed is relevant in determining whether demonstrable overbreadth is
substantial.” Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 595-96 (1989) (quotation
marks omitted). This is so because when a law is overbroad, the threat of severe
penalties will cause many individuals to “choose not to speak because of
uncertainty whether his claim of privilege might prevail if challenged.” Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
Here, the entire school district risks up to ten percent of its State funding for
a single violation. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(B). And it was designed that way.
Horne emphasized that the statute’s financial penalties were sufficiently severe to
frighten schools into compliance: “In my eight years as superintendent of schools,
I’ve never seen a district not come into compliance when faced with a severe
financial penalty.” Horne: Tucson District Violates Ethnic Studies Ban,
MyFoxPhoenix.com, (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/story/18140282/horne-tucson-district-violatesethnic-studties-ban.
The penalty applies to an entire district, not just to the school or program
with the offending material. And since schools generally allocate funds well in
advance of the school year (to hire teachers, acquire books and materials, etc.), the
district-wide penalty threatens the special chaos inherent in re-balancing multiple
budgets that have already been committed or spent. In this era of falling tax
17
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revenues and state budget constraints, responsible educators are unlikely to risk
even a remote possibility of such a significant financial hit.
This severe penalty will chill educators from choosing a significant amount
of protected material which would not violate the statute, and which students have
a First Amendment right to receive. Instead, “rather than undertake the
considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through caseby-case litigation, [they] will choose simply to abstain from protected speech –
harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119 (citation omitted).
Where, as here, the marketplace at issue is the classroom, which “is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas,’” Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603, this chill has a wide reach.8
C.

The Statute Is Overbroad Because Educators Cannot Know What
Materials Are Allowed and Which Are Forbidden.

To ensure that “public school pupils should be taught to treat and value each
other as individuals and not be taught to resent or hate other races or classes of
people” the statute lists four categories of content which may not be “included” in

8

The 60-day period before financial freezing begins does not mitigate the threat.
Teachers cannot re-vamp an entire curriculum in mid-course, especially for classes
required by the State. Additionally, as the MAS program demonstrated, books
deemed offensive will be physically removed from the classroom (boxed up and
locked away), see ER 1164-67, with no money to purchase replacements. Given
the risk to continuity of teaching, the risk of losing significant monies, and the risk
of losing actual materials with no replacements, teachers will be forced to choose –
and students will only receive – materials that raise no risk of loss.
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the program of instruction. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-111, 15-112(A). Yet these
forbidden categories encompass materials far beyond the stated purpose of the
statute. Moreover, although the statute speaks of “courses or classes,” both
Superintendent Huppenthal and the Administrative Law Judge named specific
books, poems, and classroom materials in finding a violation. See ER 1092-94,
1098-1104, 1132-42.9 Thus, observers can only conclude that the use of a single
book or poem can render the “course or class” illegal. As applied, then, the statute
will inevitably chill educators from presenting a wide range of serious literature
and history relating to topics such as revolution, oppression, and racism.
1. Section 15-112(A)(1) – Promoting “the overthrow of the United
States government”
The first category prohibits material promoting the overthrow of the
government. This is not the first attempt to restrict such materials. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has invalidated a similar state statute which prohibited teachers
from advising, teaching, or advocating the forceful overthrow of the government.
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 599-602. While the Court accepted that the State had a
legitimate interest “in protecting its education system from subversion,” id. at 602,

9

When evaluating the overbreadth of a statute, a court must consider the State’s
own implementation and interpretation of the statute. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992); see also Comite de Jornaleros, 657 F.3d at
946.
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the law was nonetheless unconstitutional because teachers could not know what
sort of conduct was prohibited.
Does the teacher who carries a copy of the Communist Manifesto on a
public street thereby advocate criminal anarchy? It is no answer to
say that the statute would not be applied in such a case. ... The teacher
cannot know the extent, if any, to which a ‘seditious’ utterance must
transcend mere statement about abstract doctrine, the extent to which
it must be intended to and tend to indoctrinate or incite to action in
furtherance of the defined doctrine. The crucial consideration is that
no teacher can know just where the line is drawn between ‘seditious’
and nonseditious utterances and acts.
Id. at 599.
Here, despite the fact that “promote” and “advocate” are essentially
synonymous, the District Court held that “promote” was not overbroad because it
must mean “actively presenting material in a biased, political, and emotionally
charged manner.” ER 18. This gloss is wholly missing from the statute, but even
accepting it, the statute is no less vague or overbroad. Indeed, this gloss may make
the statute even broader, since the prohibition now seems to turns on the style of
the teaching or whether the material at issue has an emotional component.
Suppose, for example, that a teacher assigned students to read an essay by
Henry David Thoreau, who advocated the right to revolt against the government.
Thoreau wrote:
All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse
allegiance to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its
inefficiency are great and unendurable. ... [W]hen a sixth of the
population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty
20
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are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by
a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too
soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty
the more urgent is that fact, that the country so overrun is not our own,
but ours is the invading army.
Henry David Thoreau, Resistance to Civil Government (1849), reprinted in Henry
D. Thoreau Essays 145, 149 (Jeffery S. Cramer ed., 2013). Certainly this work –
which urges not just a right but an actual duty to revolt against the government in
certain circumstances – can be understood to “promote” the overthrow of
government. Can a teacher use this text at all? Does the use depend on whether
the teacher “actively” presents the material in an “emotionally charged” manner?
If the material itself is emotionally charged, as Thoreau’s call to arms certainly is,
and the teacher asks the students to consider it in connection with current
American political life, is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the teacher is
“promoting” the overthrow of government by presenting the views of another
American who promoted that end?
Or suppose the curriculum involves George Orwell’s 1984, a dystopian
novel that warns of the threats posed by a totalitarian government propped up by
surveillance and censorship. If the teacher asked students to compose essays
comparing Orwell’s Big Brother to the current U.S. National Security
Administration using documents released by Edward Snowden, would such a
project risk being deemed one that promotes the overthrow of the U.S.
21
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government? Would that conclusion depend on whether the teacher is deemed to
have displayed “bias” by bringing up the current political example of the NSA to
illuminate the theme and lessons of the novel?
Just as the statute in Keyishian violated the Constitution because teachers
could not tell when the line had been crossed between non-seditious and seditious,
so too § 15-112(A)(1) creates an uncertain and wide no-man’s land where teachers
cannot know what characteristics will separate either permitted materials or means
of teaching those materials from those which are prohibited. American history and
literature are filled with stories of the valiant, as well as the quisling, acting in
rebellion against the government. The threat that teaching a novel or poem with
rebellious sentiment might be deemed to promote the overthrow of the U.S.
government is nearly certain to chill a broad range of instruction which students
have a First Amendment right to receive, especially in light of the significant
penalty to be paid for guessing wrong.
2. Section 15-112(A)(2) – Promoting “resentment toward a race or
class of people”
The district court applied the same analysis it applied to (A)(1) to uphold
(A)(2). For the reasons discussed above, this decision is flawed. Nor is it
consistent with the way the State actually applied the provision. Indeed,
Huppenthal concluded the MAS program violated this provision, in part, because
particular class materials “repeatedly reference white people as being ‘oppressors’
22
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and ‘oppressing’ the Latino people,” or “present only one perspective of historical
events, that of the Latino people being persecuted.” ER 1093. Huppenthal
identified this passage from American History from Chicano/a Perspectives as an
example of text that promotes resentment toward a race or class of people:
Within [sic] the exception of genocide, one of the worst crimes
committed by the European invaders against indigenous peoples was
the destruction of nearly all their culture, thought [sic] beliefs,
traditions, and language. This atrocity has left the majority of the
hemisphere’s indigenous population in disarray and confusion as to
their true identity.
ER 1098.
If this relatively straightforward passage justifies a finding that the
curriculum using that passage violates § 15-112(A)(2), it is hard to see how
teachers could present materials describing racism, slavery, imperialism or
genocide without risking a similar finding. Thus, they will avoid serious and
substantial works that explore these themes, such as Joseph Conrad’s Heart of
Darkness, which tells the story of imperialism and racism in Africa. The Diary of
Anne Frank poses a risk since it presents the holocaust from only one perspective.
Including any of these books in a course which invites students to actually engage
with the materials could easily be found to “[p]romote resentment toward a race or
class of people,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(A)(2), particularly when compared with
the text found so offensive by Huppenthal. And this is so even though these
materials can be (and usually are) used to spark discussions that promote tolerance
23
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among students who use them to explore the harms caused by political and racial
hatred and resentment. 10
The specter of the serious financial and political consequences of violating
the statute, combined with the uncertainty regarding which materials may be found
improper, will lead Arizona’s responsible teachers to avoid materials that raise
themes of racism, imperialism, or genocide. Thus the statute will smother
materials and courses requiring students to wrestle with these issues, despite the
fact that the State has asserted no interest in censoring such materials.
3. Section 15-112(A)(3) – “Are designed primarily for pupils of a
particular ethnic group”
The district court properly held this provision to be overbroad. It did so
because the provision did not advance the pedagogical interest underlying the
statute, but it “threaten[ed] to chill the teaching of legitimate and objective ethnic
studies courses.” See ER 19. The Court of Appeals should uphold this portion of
the District Court’s decision because, like the others, this provision threatens to
substantially chill the use of books and literature well beyond those that further the
interests of the statute.

10

This Court has also identified books which are claimed to “portray Caucasians in
a derogatory fashion” and which could therefore be seen to promote resentment of
Caucasians, such as Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon and Mark Mathabane’s
Kaffir Boy, for example. Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1030 & n.11. Under § 15-112,
those works would likely be avoided for fear of violating the statute.
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Superintendent Huppenthal criticized materials in the MAS curriculum that
“address the reader as being of Latino or Hispanic origin and thus a part of an
oppressed people.” ER 1093. For example, he found violations in text that read,
“The process of dehumanization since the arrival of the White Nation (not a
pejorative term) has stripped away our true identity.” ER 1102. But if addressing
a reader as one of a kindred group disqualifies a book, then teachers will avoid
Maya Angelou’s autobiography which contains graphic and painful descriptions of
her experiences, as a child in the American South, of rape, hate, and racism: “My
race groaned. It was our people falling. It was another lynching, yet another Black
man hanging on a tree. One more woman ambushed and raped.” Maya Angelou, I
Know Why the Caged Bird Sings 131 (Random House 1997) (1969). And students
will not be allowed to engage in class with Amy Tan’s The Joy Luck Club, which
dissects the relationships and conflicts between Chinese immigrant mothers and
their American-raised daughters. Because this provision, like the others, sweeps
far too broadly for First Amendment purposes, the district court properly
invalidated it.
4. Section 15-112(A)(4) – Advocating “ethnic solidarity instead of the
treatment of pupils as individuals.”
The last section of the statute, prohibiting courses that “advocate” ethic
solidarity, is also overbroad. Conceding that this provision “would not survive”
scrutiny if it simply proscribed courses that “taught ethnic solidarity,” the district
25
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court nevertheless held that the “instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals”
language saved the provision by making it reasonably related to “legitimate
pedagogical concerns.” ER 21.
Again, the State’s interpretation of the provision undercuts this analysis.
Huppenthal and the ALJ found the MAS program violated the provision because
some classes in that program included particular books that were perceived as
being too focused on “ethnic solidarity.” Yet they paid no regard to whether the
class also advocated for individual treatment of persons. Thus, the limiting
language does not cure the overbreadth the district court recognized. For example,
Superintendent Huppenthal cited the following as an exemplar of text that violates
the statute: “Since then Raza resistance has never died and that is the message of
this book. ... We saw that the enemy wasn’t simply the gringo but a system that
dictated how U.S. society should be organized. Capitalismo, imperialism,
socialism ... racism.” ER 1103 (alterations in original).
But if permitted works can address ethnic identity only if they advocate
individualism “instead of” ethnic identity, then teachers will necessarily avoid
books that present ethnic identity because of the risk that they will trigger the
penalties. Thus, a teacher would likely believe that the Autobiography of Malcolm
X is prohibited since there, the author wrote, “I reflected many, many times to
myself upon how the American Negro has been entirely brainwashed from ever
26
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seeing or thinking of himself, as he should, as a part of the nonwhite peoples of the
world.” Malcom X, The Autobiography of Malcom X As Told To Alex Haley 352
(Random House 1999) (1964). Similarly, Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart is
praised for telling the story of colonialism from the perspective of Africans. Yet it
is critical of the destruction of tribal culture that occurred after Europeans occupied
Africa. Is that book prohibited if it does not advocate the treatment of people as
individuals instead of ethnic solidarity?
Even assigning Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”
could risk sanction since Dr. King expresses frustration at the inaction of moderate
whites:
I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro’s great
stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White
Citizen’s Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate,
who is more devoted to “order” than to justice; who prefers a negative
peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the
presence of justice; who constantly says: “I agree with you in the goal
you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action”; who
paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man’s
freedom ....
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available
at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
Do these materials discussed above “advocate ethnic solidarity” instead of
individualism because they reflect that strength can come from such solidarity? If
not, how would a teacher distinguish them from the materials Huppenthal found
27
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violated the provision? Because teachers will not be able to tell what materials and
curriculum will be sufficiently individualistic and which focus too much on “ethnic
solidarity,” they are likely to avoid materials altogether that relate to ethnic
solidarity, thus accomplishing the very end that the District Court noted would be
unconstitutional.
The point, of course, is not that Dr. King – or any of the other authors
discussed above – actually did advocate for ethnic solidarity, promote resentment
against a race, promote the overthrow of the government, or write primarily for a
specific ethnic group. The point is that these books illuminate both the strengths of
solidarity and the weaknesses of insularity and separation. Yet in light of materials
Arizona has declared forbidden under the statute, teachers cannot know what
materials risk a similar finding, and they will therefore avoid materials raising
these themes at all. They will be forced to teach about the civil rights movement,
Jim Crow, the revolutionary war, slavery, colonization, and Manifest Destiny
while trying to avoid the risk that a single book or poem addressing the ethnic and
racial history bound up in our country’s history could be quoted out of context and
declared in violation of the law. 11

11

Nor would a State’s assurance that it would not use the statute unreasonably
remedy the overbreadth. This Court must “not uphold an unconstitutional statute
merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.” Stevens, 559 U.S.
at 480.
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The Narrowing Provisions Cannot Save the Statute from this
Overbreadth.

Although subsections (E) and (F) of the statute appear designed to narrow
the scope of the law, they neither narrow its scope nor alleviate its chill. Both the
text and application of the statute demonstrate that even instruction that appears to
fall within the language of these narrowing clauses can violate the statute.
First, subsection (E)(3) is a circular provision that states that “[c]ourses or
classes that include the history of any ethnic group and that are open to all
students” are not restricted “unless the course or class violates subsection A.”
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(E)(3) (emphasis added). In other words, anything that
would be illegal under subsection (A) is still illegal under subsection (E)(3). This
savings provision saves nothing. If material used in a class could fall within one of
the forbidden subject areas, the fact that the class includes ethnic history and is
open to all students is entirely irrelevant and provides no safe harbor.
Similarly, while the statute purports not to reach “[c]ourses or classes that
include the discussion of controversial aspects of history,” id. § 15-112(E)(4), or
“the historical oppression of a particular group of people,” id. § 15-112(F), the
statute clearly does reach those courses since nothing in the saving clause provides
a safe harbor for teaching those subjects if the materials or classes are found to
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violate subsection (A). 12 And it is clear that the context of a class will not “save”
particular materials. To the contrary, the Administrative Law Judge found, and
Superintendent Huppenthal adopted the conclusion, that as to the materials at issue,
there was “no way to use the materials without being in violation of the law.” ER
1146 (emphasis added). In other words, under the State’s interpretation, the
context in which a book is taught is irrelevant for purposes of § 15-112. In short,
the exceptions provisions of the statute provide no “exceptions” at all. Cf. Stevens,
559 U.S. at 479 (holding that exceptions clause did not save overbroad statute
because “[t]here is simply no adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results
in the statute’s banning only the depictions the Government would like to ban”).
Thus, the exceptions will not alleviate teachers’ legitimate fear. They create
no safe harbor that will allow teachers to use materials in the classroom that
address the forbidden issues, without fear of incurring the significant penalties.
Under § 15-112, classroom instruction and students’ access to information
on topics that the State has asserted no legitimate pedagogical interest in restricting
will be substantially restricted. Students’ exposure to important but painful parts
of history, the voices of the oppressed, and the writings of controversial figures
will be squeezed out of the classroom – even if these subjects are discussed in a

12

Indeed, one of the reasons the MAS program was found to violate the statute was
that a book spoke of oppression from the perspective of the oppressed group. ER
1090.
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manner that does teach students “to treat and value each other as individuals” and
not “to resent or hate other races or classes of people,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111.
The statute must be ruled unconstitutionally overbroad.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Arizona Revised Statute § 15-112 violates the
First Amendment.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/ David A Handzo
David A. Handzo
Julie M. Carpenter
Elizabeth C. Bullock
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
1099 New York Ave. NW Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
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